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Turkey and the Codification of Autocracy 
Steven Blockmans and Sinem Yilmaz 
Summary 
Turkey’s Parliament has approved a constitutional reform bill that will come into effect if approved in 
the national referendum on 16 April 2017. This controversial package seeks to replace the current par-
liamentary system with a fully fledged executive presidential system, without checks and balances.  
If President Erdoğan’s constitutional reform bill is approved, it will centralise power around the presi-
dency and the current separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches will 
cease to be. This raises the question of whether Turkey, with its new constitution, will continue to satisfy 
the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership.  
 
Most EU leaders and institutions have remained conspicuously silent on the matter of constitutional 
‘reform’ in Turkey. Considering the country’s backsliding on compliance with the Copenhagen political 
criteria, the authors of this paper argue that it is time for the EU to deliver a strong message that draws 
attention to the undemocratic nature of the amendments and the possibility of suspending accession 
talks if the bill is passed. The EU’s red line on the reintroduction of the death penalty should not become 
a red herring to divert attention from the deeply problematic constitutional ‘reform’ process. Similarly, 
Turkey’s strategic importance should not override the Union’s core democratic principles.  
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1. Introduction 
The failed military coup of 15 July 2016 left 241 people dead and 2,196 wounded, and has 
become a turning point in Turkey’s political history. In the immediate aftermath of the attempt, 
President Erdoğan declared a three-month state of emergency, which has been extended for 
up to 12 months. Now ruling via executive decrees, the government has cracked down on the 
country’s military, police force, academia, judiciary, education system, civil service, media and 
business community (see Appendix). Almost 130,000 people have been sacked, 45,000 
arrested and more than 92,000 detained.1 
Meanwhile, Turkey’s internal security challenges have multiplied since the collapse of the 
peace process between the government and the Kurds in July 2015. Mounting violence in the 
south-east of the country and various terrorist attacks in metropolitan areas have also left at 
least 2,571 civilians, state security forces and PKK militants dead.2 The terrorist threat to Turkey 
is not limited to Kurdish separatists. The so-called Islamic State has also struck on Turkish soil, 
as both the cause and effect of Ankara’s policy towards Syria and its military intervention in 
that country under the codename Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey, in cooperation with 
Russia and Iran, has recently taken steps to restart negotiations for a peace process in Syria. 
Turkey hosts nearly 2 million refugees from the war in Syria. 
During this period of high tension on the domestic and external front, the President’s Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) has revived the constitutional reform package that was put on 
hold in December 2013. The proposed amendments met strong opposition in parliament but 
were nevertheless approved by an AKP-led majority on 21 January 2017. 3  The president 
endorsed the reform bill in February and a referendum is scheduled for 16 April 2017. This 
controversial package seeks to replace the current parliamentary system with a presidential 
one – of the autocratic kind. This raises the question of whether Turkey, with its new 
constitution, will continue to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria, which is the conditio sine 
qua non for any candidate country to remain in the EU’s pre-accession process. The short 
answer is ‘No’. This view is supported by the findings of the Venice Commission – the Council 
of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters, whose opinions on the Turkish 
                                                     
1 The website http://turkeypurge.com tracks the numbers in several categories. These figures differ from the offi-
cial numbers included in the executive decrees presented in the Appendix, partially as a result of differences in 
classification. Rights groups have reported a sharp increase in cases of torture, sexual abuse and other forms of 
ill-treatment in detention, as well as violations of detainees’ right to judicial protection. See, e.g., Amnesty Inter-
national, “Annual Report 2016/17” (www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/turkey/report-tur-
key/); Human Rights Watch, “A Blank Check: Turkey’s Post-Coup Suspension of Safeguards against Torture”, Octo-
ber 2016 (www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/turkey1016_web.pdf). 
2 International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.be/interactives/turkey/). 
3 Members of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) supported the vote, the procedure of which was riddled 
with irregularities (www.hurriyetdailynews.com/secret-ballot-debate-grows-as-charter-talks-proceed.aspx? 
PageID=238&NID=108381&NewsCatID=338). 
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constitutional amendments, freedom of the media, and peace judges were adopted on 10 
March 2017.4  
2. Constitutional Changes 
For years, the AK Party has railed against the current constitution of 1982, which was written 
under military tutelage. In fact, the AK Party’s unrelenting push for reform raised hopes in 
society for the first-ever civilian constitution in Turkish history. With the aim of establishing a 
stable democracy with civilian control over the military, the AKP passed a series of 
constitutional amendments during its first time in power in 2002. Heeding EU demands, these 
reforms saw the abolition of the death penalty and an increased level of democratic freedoms 
and human rights protection. The direct election of the president, introduced in a constitutional 
amendment in 2007, turned Turkey’s parliamentary system into a semi-presidential one. 
Further attempts to bolster the power of the president ran aground over the AKP’s 
determination to bring the military to heel in the ‘Sledgehammer’ and ‘Ergenekon’ cases, 
named after alleged military coup plots in 2003 and 2007, respectively. Both cases were 
procedurally flawed and accompanied by a witch-hunt among the armed forces. The AKP’s 
concomitant attempts at constitutional reform were suspended in 2013 due to the political fall-
out of the crackdown on demonstrators at Gezi Park, and corruption scandals which implicated 
members of (then Prime Minster) Erdoğan’s government, family and circle of cronies. Declaring 
his government the victim of a plot designed by a ‘parallel state’, Erdoğan muzzled the media, 
dismissed and arrested thousands of police, prosecutors and judges, thereby evading justice. 
This crackdown escalated into a massive purge in the wake of the failed military coup of July 
2016. It is in this context that the AKP, with the support of the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP), submitted a draft bill to parliament introducing a fully fledged executive presidential 
system. 
The constitutional reform package, which comprises 18 articles,5 projects the accumulation of 
so much power in the position of the president that, if the bill passes in the referendum in April 
– which polls indicate it will, the current separation of powers between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches will be lost. Rather than introducing a “Turkish-style” 
                                                     
4 See the website of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (www.venice.coe.int/webforms/events/ 
?lang=EN). The Venice Commission had issued earlier reports about constitutional reform in Turkey. See Opinion 
on the Constitutional and Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey, CDL-
AD(2009)006; and Interim Opinion on the Draft Law on the High Council for Judges and Prosecutors of Turkey, 
CDL-AD(2010)042. The Venice Commission also issued an opinion in the wake of the constitutional amendment 
enacted on 20 May 2016, by which the parliamentary immunity of several members of parliament was lifted, and 
which was followed by the detention of in November 2016 of the president and several deputies of the second-
largest and pro-Kurdish opposition party HDP. See Opinion on the Suspension of the Second Paragraph of Article 
83 of the Constitution of Turkey (parliamentary inviolability), CDL-AD(2016)027. 
5 Venice Commission, Turkey: Unofficial Translation of the Amendments to the Constitution, Strasbourg, 6 Febru-
ary 2017, CDL-REF(2017)005; see also CDL-REF(2017)003 and 018. 
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presidential system akin to those in France and the US, the constitutional amendments 
represent the codification of autocracy, pure and simple.6 
2.1 Legislative power 
Under the current constitution,7 the legislative power is vested in the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey (TGNA). The entry into force of the proposed amendments will see a demonstrable 
decline in the powers of parliament, thereby damaging the system of checks and balances. This 
decline starts with parliament’s powers of inquiry and debate with the executive. 
Parliament’s Powers of Inquiry 
The TGNA currently exercises its supervisory power by means of oral and written questions, 
parliamentary inquiry, general debate, censure and parliamentary investigations (Article 98). The 
duties and powers of parliament are to authorise and scrutinise the Council of Ministers and ministers 
individually (Article 87). Parliamentary investigation may be requested against the prime minister or 
ministers through a motion tabled by at least one-tenth of the total members of the TGNA (Article 
100, to be abolished). The President of the Republic may be impeached for high treason on the 
proposal of at least one-third of the total number of members of the TGNA and by a decision of at 
least three-quarters of the total number of members (Article 105).  
Parliament’s powers of inquiry decrease 
In the proposed amendments, the TGNA must exercise its powers of acquiring information and 
supervision by means of parliamentary inquiry, general debate, parliamentary investigations and 
written questions. The right to oral questions will be abolished. In the proposed amendments, vice-
presidents and ministers will be accountable to the president and parliamentary investigation may be 
requested against them through a motion tabled by an absolute majority of the total number of 
members of the TGNA. The assembly may decide to launch an investigation with at least three-fifths 
majority of the total number of members, by secret ballot. The TGNA may take a decision to refer to 
the Supreme Court with two-thirds majority of the total number of members by secret ballot (Article 
106). Parliamentary investigations may be requested claiming that the president has committed a 
crime through a motion tabled by an absolute majority of the total number of members of the TGNA. 
Three-fifths majority of the total number of members will be required to launch the investigation and 
two-thirds majority will be required to refer to the Supreme Court (Article 105). 
 
The Turkish parliament’s role in scrutinising government will be further reduced with the shift 
of the right of investiture and the dismissal of ministers. In fact, both the status and the 
structure of the cabinet will change. 
                                                     
6  Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been keen to pronounce that a “Turkish-style” presidential system is needed 
(www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-style-presidential-system-needed-erdogan-repeats.aspx?pageID=238&nID 
=78988&NewsCatID=338). 
7 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf). 
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Parliament’s Power of Scrutiny 
A vote of confidence for the Council of Ministers will be held before it takes office (Article 110, to be 
abolished); if the prime minister deems it necessary, there may be another vote of confidence while 
the ministers are in office (Article 111, to be abolished). A motion of censure will be tabled on behalf 
of a political party group or by the signature of at least 20 deputies. In order to unseat the Council of 
Ministers or a minister, an absolute majority vote of the total number of members is required, in which 
only the votes of no-confidence may be counted (Article 99, to be abolished).  
Parliament’s power to scrutinise government shifts to the president 
In future, there will be no Council of Ministers (Article 109, to be abolished). The president will appoint 
and dismiss vice-presidents and ministers (Article 104). 
 
What is more, under the proposed amendments the president’s right to retain ties to a political 
party would negate the rule of impartiality and give him or her broad powers to control 
parliament and its agenda. The distinction between the executive and legislative branches 
would be blurred. 
Legislative Powers and Party Membership 
Under the current constitution, if the president-elect is a member of a party, his/her relationship with 
that party would be severed and his/her membership of the TGNA would cease (Article 101). 
The president acquires legislative powers 
In the proposed changes, if a deputy is elected as president, his/her membership of the TGNA would 
cease. The first part of Article 101 is deleted, however, thus granting the president the right to act as 
a member – or even the leader – of a political party. According to the amended Article 77, 
parliamentary and presidential elections would henceforth take place simultaneously, diminishing 
chances of co-habitation – and thus the separation of powers. 
 
In future, the power to legislate would still be vested in the TGNA but the president would also 
obtain a right to rule by means of decree. While this right does not extend to categories of basic 
rights and freedoms, political rights and duties,8 the trend of legislative powers flowing to the 
presidency is confirmed. 
                                                     
8 i.e., the basic rights and freedoms enshrined in the first and second chapters of the second part of the current 
constitution, as well as the political rights and duties laid down in the fourth chapter. Areas unregulated by law 
can be covered by presidential decrees. 
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Duties and Powers of the TGNA 
The duties and powers of the TGNA are to enact, amend and repeal laws and to issue decrees having 
the force of law on certain matters (Article 87). 
Parliament’s power to issue decrees shifts to the president 
Parliament’s power to issue decrees having the force of law is removed from the amended Article 87. 
The head of state may issue presidential decrees on matters of executive power. In the event of 
conflict between presidential decrees and existing laws, the latter would prevail. The president may 
issue by-laws to ensure the implementation of laws, providing that they are not contrary to these laws 
and regulations (amended Article 104). 
 
2.2 Executive power 
The draft bill allows for the creation of vice-presidential positions. The abolition of the office of 
prime minister and that of the cabinet would give the president the unsupervised power to 
appoint and dismiss ministers and vice-presidents. 
Powers of Appointment 
Under the current constitution, ministers are appointed and dismissed by the president upon the 
proposal of the prime minister (Article 109, to be abolished). 
The prime minister’s powers shift to the president 
In the proposed amendments, the post of prime minister is annulled (Article 109, to be abolished). 
Future ministers would be appointed and dismissed by the president (amended Article 104). 
 
Moreover, the president would gain the almost unfettered power to establish the budget. 
Budgetary Powers 
The Council of Ministers submits to the TGNA a budget bill and report indicating the national 
budgetary estimates (Article 162, to be abolished). 
Government’s budgetary powers move to the president 
According to the amended Article 161, the president must submit the central government’s budget 
bill to the TGNA’s Budget Committee. The amendment is silent on what happens if the budget 
proposal is rejected in the plenary. In that case, the president could arguably still dispose of the re-
evaluated budget of the previous year, thus bypassing parliament. The TGNA could only block such a 
move by dissolving itself and triggering new presidential elections. 
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Also, responsibility for national security policies would move from the government to the 
president. 
National Security Policies 
In the current constitution, the Council of Ministers, to which the National Security Council reports, is 
responsible to the TGNA for the national security policies and the preparation of the armed forces for 
the defence of the country (Articles 104, 117 and 118). 
Government’s responsibility for national security policies shifts to the president 
According to the new draft constitution, it would be the president who “determines the national 
security policies and takes the necessary measures” (amended Article 104) and who would be 
responsible to the TGNA (amended Article 117). The National Security Council would report to the 
president (amended Article 118). Its advisory role would remain unchanged but instead of its 
organisation and duties being regulated by law, they would henceforth be regulated by presidential 
decree. 
 
The president will be granted the exclusive power to declare a state of emergency.  
Declaration of a State of Emergency 
Under the current constitution, the Council of Ministers, meeting under the chairmanship of the 
president, after consultation with the National Security Council, may declare a state of emergency 
(Article 120, to be abolished). 
Only the president can declare a state of emergency 
In future, the president alone would decide on the declaration of a state of emergency and the issuing 
of the necessary decrees (amended Article 119), i.e. without the limitations set forth in Article 104 
(about basic rights and freedoms, political rights and duties). 
 
All in all, this new constitution would accumulate and invest an excessive amount of executive 
power in the office of the president. 
2.3 Judicial power 
In any parliamentary and presidential system, the judiciary has to be fully independent to be 
able to check, and if necessary vote down, acts adopted by the executive and the legislative. 
While the draft constitutional package abolishes the system of military courts (Article 145), a 
change which ought to be welcomed, the amendments are neither absolute (special 
disciplinary courts may remain in the armed forces, cf. Article 142(2)), nor do they prevent the 
transfer of jurisdiction to civil courts from falling under the control of the president. 
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The draft bill introduces other changes that limit the judicial independence vis-à-vis the 
president. For instance, the competence of the Council of State to review draft legislation 
proposed by the Council of Ministers has been removed. Conversely, the advisory body has not 
been given the competence to give its opinion on presidential decrees, which would have been 
desirable in view of the potential conflicts with existing laws. 
Also, the proposed amendments allow the president to tighten his or her grip on the (High) 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors, which performs, inter alia, a disciplinary function in the legal 
system in Turkey. 
Appointment of the Judiciary 
Under the current constitution, the president appoints three of the 22 regular members of the Council 
of Judges and Prosecutors. Seven members are appointed by the TGNA; seven are chosen by 
administrative judges and public prosecutors; three more are elected. The President of the Council is 
the Minister of Justice. The Undersecretary for Justice is an ex officio member of the Council (Article 
159). 
Judicial power diminishes and moves to the executive and legislative 
In the proposed amendments, the Council of Judges and Prosecutors would be reduced to 13 
members, four of which would be appointed by the president. The Minister of Justice and his/her 
Undersecretary would remain the president, resp. an ex officio member of the Council, but under the 
draft bill both would be appointed by the president in the government. The TGNA would appoint the 
other seven members of the High Council (amended Article 159). If the president hails from a political 
party that has the majority in parliament, then a single political family would be able to appoint all 
members of the High Council. 
 
The Council of Judges and Prosecutors is also responsible for the election of members of the 
Court of Cassation and the Council of State, which, in turn, nominate candidates for the 
Constitutional Court. Any greater influence of the president on the High Council would thus 
have a knock-on effect on the composition of the Constitutional Court. 
Constitutional Court Powers 
Currently, the Constitutional Court checks laws empowering the Council of Ministers to issue decrees 
having the force of law (Article 148). 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is restricted 
The Council of Ministers would no longer be able to issue decrees having the force of law (amended 
Article 87) and the president would not need an empowering law when issuing his or her decrees 
(amended Article 104). Under the amendments, the Constitutional Court would lose the possibility to 
check for potential conflicts between presidential and existing laws. 
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From the foregoing it is clear that the proposed constitutional reform package represents a 
retreat from democratic values in Turkey and violates the principle of the separation of powers. 
The envisaged “Turkish-style” presidential system is a step back from the rule of law; if enacted 
the new constitution will codify the law of the ruler. This begs the question whether Turkey, 
with its new constitution, would still satisfy the political criteria for EU membership. 
3. Political Criteria for EU Membership 
The promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law was not an aim proclaimed in 
the constituent treaties of the European Communities (EC), or a prerequisite for joining them. 
Nevertheless, compliance with such standards could be inferred as a necessary condition for 
membership, in that the original members were all democracies, although in the cases of Italy 
and West Germany, relatively fledgling ones. Accession negotiations with Greece, Portugal and 
Spain were only opened in the mid-1970s, after the respective authoritarian regimes had 
collapsed and these states had embarked upon a course of democratisation.  
While the limited scope of membership conditionality was enough to allow the EC/EU to 
expand to 15 members without undermining its functioning, the prospect of the ‘reunification 
of Europe’ (after the fall of the iron curtain and the entry of ten or more mostly poor post-
communist states) triggered the June 1993 European Council Summit in Copenhagen to 
develop more stringent criteria to assess the level of preparedness of both these candidates 
and the EU. Since 1993, EU membership requires, inter alia, that candidate countries have 
“achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities”.9 These conditions are commonly referred to as the 
Copenhagen political criteria.10 
The Treaty of Amsterdam included a reference in the new Article 49 TEU calling on “any 
European State” applying for EU membership to respect the Union’s founding principles set out 
in Article 6(1) TEU (liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule 
of law). The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force in 1999, thereby codifying the essence of 
the first Copenhagen criterion but leaving out respect for and protection of minorities.  
Building on the demonstrative list of standards developed in its “Conclusions on the principle 
of conditionality governing the development of the European Union’s relations with certain 
countries of south-east Europe” of 29 April 1997, the Council has helped to clarify the 
normative content of the first Copenhagen criterion while turning the concept of EU 
membership conditionality into a multi-dimensional instrument aimed at reform and 
integration: 
                                                     
9 See Bulletin EU 6-1993, point 13. 
10 For backgrounds and analysis, e.g., C. Hillion, “The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny”, in C. Hillion (ed.), 
EU Enlargement: A Legal Approach, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004; and M. Emerson, S. Aydin, J. De Clerck-Sachsse 
and G. Noutcheva, “Just what is this ‘Absorption Capacity’ of the EU?”, CEPS Policy Brief No. 113, September 2006. 
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(i) Democratic principles: representative government and accountable executive; 
government and public authorities to act in a manner consistent with the constitution and 
the law; separation of powers (government, administration, judiciary); free and fair 
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot.  
(ii) Human rights, rule of law: freedom of expression, including independent media; right 
of assembly and demonstration; right of association; right to privacy, family, home and 
correspondence; right to property; effective means of redress against administrative 
decisions; access to courts and right to fair trial; equality before the law and equal 
protection by the law; freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment and arbitrary arrest.  
(iii) Respect for and protection of minorities: right to establish and maintain their own 
educational, cultural and religious institutions, organisations or associations; adequate 
opportunities for minorities to use their own language before courts and public authorities; 
adequate protection of refugees and displaced persons returning to areas where they 
represent an ethnic minority.11 
In the latest development of the contents of EU membership conditionality, the Lisbon Treaty 
has amended Article 49 TEU to refer to Article 2 TEU, which now includes an explicit reference 
to the respect for minority rights and clarifies some of the principles upon which the open and 
democratic societies of EU member states are based: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail.  
Another, more striking, amendment of the EU membership clause concerns the addition of the 
following sentence to the first paragraph: 
The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into 
account. 
This sentence not only codifies the criteria developed by the 1993 European Council at 
Copenhagen; its open-ended wording also suggests that further changes to the contents of EU 
membership conditionality decided upon in future European Council meetings should not be 
excluded from the scope of Article 49 TEU. 
In its annual reports the European Commission closely monitors progress in fulfilling the EU’s 
membership conditions. Through screening processes in the pre-accession phase, the 
Commission identifies the main weaknesses and technical adaptations needed by the candidate 
countries, sets out priorities and benchmarks accordingly and directs EU funds towards relevant 
projects. 
                                                     
11 See Bulletin EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1. 
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4. Writing on the Wall 
Turkey, which was attributed the status of ‘candidate country’ by the December 1999 European 
Council meeting in Helsinki,12 has been closely scrutinised by the European Commission ever 
since Ankara submitted its application for membership in April 1987. Several positive progress 
reports by the Commission, and Ankara’s expressed intention to continue its reforms towards 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, led the December 2002 European Council to 
envisage accession negotiations if and when Turkey fulfilled the political criteria for EU 
membership.13 After the Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations in 
October 2004,14 the European Council of December declared the Copenhagen political criteria 
“sufficiently” fulfilled to start membership talks on 3 October 2005, subject to the further 
conditions that Turkey enact amendments to six statutes relating mainly to the judiciary and 
that it recognise the Republic of Cyprus by signing the Adaptation Protocol to the 1963 
Association Agreement.15 
Despite substantial progress in various areas, mainly economic, the necessity of further reforms 
in the areas of justice, rule of law and human rights has always been prominent on the 
Commission’s pre-accession agenda for Turkey. The gradual regression in complying with the 
Copenhagen political criteria has been well documented by the Commission in successive 
annual reports. In its most recent report on Turkey, the European Commission underlined, inter 
alia, the deterioration in the security situation in the south-east of the country, widespread 
fundamental human rights violations due to disproportionate anti-terror measures, and a 
“backsliding” in the independence of judiciary with “extensive changes to the structures and 
compositions of high courts”.16 The Commission also qualified parliament’s role in law-making 
as “limited” and its oversight of the executive as “weak” due to political polarisation. It is fair to 
say that the constitutional reform package represents the culmination of this descent into 
autocracy.  
The argument that a presidential constitutional system may not necessarily lead to autocratic 
behaviour should be rejected. For years, it has been plain for all to see that it is Erdogan’s 
intention to legitimise and codify his slide into authoritarianism by way of constitutional reform, 
sanctioned by popular mandate. The proposed constitutional amendments have been 
pushed through under the state of emergency by excessive use of urgent procedures with 
insufficient consultation and minimal input from experts. The mass liquidation of media outlets 
                                                     
12 See Bulletin EU 12-1999, point 12. For background analysis into this political decision, see W. Park, “Turkey’s 
European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki – to Ankara”, Mediterranean Politics No. 5, Vol. 3, 2000.   
13 See Bulletin EU-12-2002, point 19. 
14 European Commission, Recommendation on Turkey’s progress towards accession, COM (2004) 656 final, at 9. 
15 See Bulletin EU 12-2004, points 19 and 22. 
16 European Commission, Turkey Report, 9 November 2016, SWD(2016) 366, (https://ec.europa.eu/neighbour-
hood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_turkey.pdf). 
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(149 were shut down) and the arrest of 162 journalists, which constitutes a breach of a 
Copenhagen political sub-criterion, have made informed public debate about the constitutional 
reform package impossible, thus eviscerating any prospect of a free and fair plebiscite, and 
adding a second violation of EU membership conditions to the list.17 
Whereas the electoral and other fundamental rights could, in theory, be easily restored after 
the enactment of the new constitution, enacting the substance of the proposed amendments 
would create structural changes which, in practice, are even less likely to be reversed any time 
soon. By transferring executive and legislative powers to the president and increasing his or her 
control over the judiciary, the draft bill would not only hollow out existing weaknesses in the 
trias politica to the extent that these institutions are rendered unstable (a third violation of the 
Copenhagen political criteria), it would also lead to the almost complete erosion of the 
separation of powers in Turkey. For this reason, too, the controversial constitutional reform, 
which seeks to replace Turkey’s parliamentary system with an autocratic presidential one, is 
incompatible with the Copenhagen criteria as enshrined in EU primary law. 
5. How the EU should respond: Red lines, not red herrings 
Apart from weak Council conclusions last November, a non-binding resolution of the European 
Parliament condemning the repressive measures taken in the wake of the failed coup, and 
calling for the suspension of accession negotiations, most EU leaders and institutions have been 
conspicuously silent on the matter of constitutional ‘reform’ in Turkey.  
This passivity is untenable in view of recent and upcoming developments. Following the sharp 
condemnation of the constitutional reform package and the state of media freedom in Turkey 
in a set of opinions adopted by the Venice Commission on 10 March 2017, the European Union 
has to speak out – not so much in an attempt to sway voters to say ‘No’ in the referendum, 
because such a tactic would undoubtedly backfire when cited by President Erdoğan and his 
followers as evidence of unwarranted intervention in Turkey’s internal political affairs. The EU 
should rather send a signal to Turkish and European citizens, and indeed others, that it upholds 
certain principles and European values. This is not the time for the Union to be tactically 
pragmatic; it is certainly not the time for appeasement. In the face of a worsening crisis of true 
democracy, a strong value statement needs to be delivered. 
The very least the European Commission should do, as guardian of the Treaties, is issue a 
statement by Johannes Hahn, responsible for Enlargement Negotiations, underlining the 
opinions of the Venice Commission, aligning with the grave concerns it expresses and warning 
of the dangers of disregarding them. The statement should also refer to the problematic 
context in which the referendum is being organised, which would render the outcome invalid. 
Finally, the statement should stress that, with the entry into force of the constitutional 
                                                     
17 Cf. Venice Commission, Opinion on the Measures Provided in the Recent Emergency Decree-laws with Respect 
to Freedom of the Media in Turkey, CDL-AD(2017)006. 
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amendments, Turkey would no longer meet the Copenhagen political criteria, leaving the 
Commission with no other choice but to advise the Council to suspend accession negotiations. 
Many European policymakers have shied away from drawing this inevitable conclusion, 
diverting attention away from the highly problematic constitutional reform process by 
repeating their warning that accession talks will be automatically suspended if Turkey 
reintroduces the death penalty. As much as this is a red line, it is also a red herring. EU leaders 
know that Ankara will not grant them the satisfaction of crossing that rubicon. Instead, they 
have allowed Erdoğan and his followers to continue unhindered on their road towards the 
codification of autocracy. 
The argument that shutting the door on Turkey’s accession to the EU would irreparably harm 
bilateral relations is not a convincing one. Over the years, the EU and Turkey have developed a 
much wider strategic agenda that serves the interests of both. This will not be cast aside on 
account of suspending dysfunctional EU accession negotiations. Erdoğan’s regime has struck a 
mutually beneficial deal with the EU to contain the flow of refugees across the Aegean – and 
Turkish territory, for that matter. Turkey remains an ally of European countries within NATO.18 
And there is renewed talk of modernising the Customs Union, facilitating even greater trade 
flows than current ones.19 In fact, conducting a strategic dialogue without having to keep up 
appearances in the context of accession talks would inject a much-needed dose of sincerity into 
the bilateral relationship. 
Turkey’s EU membership talks have barely advanced since they started more than a decade 
ago. Resolving the Cyprus issue could unlock the stalemate but hopes of a breakthrough in the 
protracted mediation process are unfortunately fading fast. Yet, irrespective of whether there 
might be a peace deal for Cyprus, Erdoğan turned his back on the EU’s pledge of membership 
years ago. His regime has already slid into authoritarianism and will cross many more red lines 
if and when it enacts the proposed constitutional reform package. 
The EU should therefore not deviate from upholding its own core principles on grounds of 
Turkey’s strategic importance for the Union. The dilution of the conditions for membership 
would not only send the wrong signal to Turkish and European citizens, it would also damage 
the credibility of the EU’s enlargement policy and could rob other pre-accession countries in 
south-east Europe of their ambition to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria.  
To be sure, the suspension of accession negotiations with Turkey would not mean the end of 
those talks. Indeed, the door should be left open to Turkey to resume membership talks if and 
when it complies with the Copenhagen political criteria, but the EU should hold firm in its 
approach and not waver in its defence of core European values. 
                                                     
18 Questions about Turkey’s increasingly autocratic nature and its compatibility with NATO membership may also 
be raised. 
19 Currently, Turkey is the EU’s 5th-biggest trading partner. See European Commission Directorate General for 
Trade, European Union Trade in Goods with Turkey, 17 February 2017 (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf). 
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Appendix: All Executive Decrees 
Decree Number Dismissed/Suspended Officers Closure/Reopening of 
Organisations Reinstatement  
Other Orders 
Executive Decree 667 
(23 July 2016) 
 Closure 
 35 Healthcare organisation 
 934 Private School 
 109 Private Dormitory 
 104 Foundation 
 1125 Association 
 15 Private University 
 19 Union 
 All movable and immovable properties, assets, 
rights and receivables of closed charitable 
foundations are transferred to the General 
Directorate of Foundations. 
 The maximum period a person may be held under 
custody has been increased to 30 days for both 
individual and collective offences. 
 Upon a decision by the public prosecutor, 
meetings between the attorney and his/her 
arrested client may be recorded, held in the 
presence of an official, limited in time or ended.  
Executive Decree 668 
(25 July 2016) 
 1684 from Turkish Armed Forces  Closure 
 45 Newspaper  
 18 Television 
 3 News Agency 
 23 Radio  
 Gendarmerie and coast guard subordinated to the 
Interior Ministry. 
Executive Decree 669 
(31 July 2016) 
 193 from Turkish Armed Forces 
 1196 Gendarmerie  
Closure 
 Military Secondary Education 
Schools  
 Army, Navy and Air Force Commands have been 
subordinated to the Minister of National Defence. 
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Executive Decree 670 
(17 August 2016) 
 196 from Information & 
Communication Technologies 
Authority  
 63 Junior Officer from Ministry of 
Defence  
 44 Petty Officer from Ministry of 
Defence  
 5 Specialist Sergeant from Ministry 
of Defence  
 24 from Coast Guard Command  
 2360 from Security General 
Directorate  
  Passport authorities will cancel the passports of 
dismissed officers. 
Executive Decree 671 
(17 August 2016) 
   The Authority may obtain and use of information, 
documentation, data, and records from the 
relevant authorities within the scope of its tasks. 
Executive Decree 672 
(1 September 2016) 
 28163 from the Ministry of 
Education 
 7669 from the Security General 
Directorate 
 323 from the Gendarmerie General 
Command  
 236 Academic  
 83 from the Council of State 
 215 from the Foreign Ministry 
 12 from the Ministry of EU Affairs 
 369 from the Interior Ministry 
 10693 from other public officers 
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Executive Decree 673 
(1 September 2016) 
 Reopening  
 54 Private School 
 Passports of spouses of those whose passports 
were revoked will also be cancelled.  
Executive Decree 674 
(1 September 2016) 
   The authorities of trustees who were appointed to 
the companies on the grounds of their 
membership, coherence or relation to terrorist 
organisations will be transferred to the Saving 
Deposits Insurance Fund.  
Executive Decree 675 
(29 October 2016) 
 183 from the Presidency of the 
Judicial Council 
 69 from the Council of State 
 2534 from the Ministry of Justice 
 102 from the Foreign Ministry 
 2219 from the Ministry of Education 
 101 from the Turkish Armed Forces 
 1082 from the Security General 
Directorate 
 1267 Academic 
 3657 from other public officers 
Closure 
 16 Newspaper 
 2 News Agency 
 3 Journal 
 1 Television 
 2 Radio 
 
Reinstatement 
 31 to Ministry of Education 
 39 to Turkish Armed Forces 
 4 to Public Offices 
 Scholarships of 68 exchange students studying 
abroad will be cut off and their degrees will not be 
recognised by Turkey. 
Executive Decree 676 
(29 October 2016) 
   Officials can monitor all conversations between 
attorneys and clients.  
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Executive Decree 677 
(22 November 2016) 
 1988 from Turkish Armed Forces 
 403 from the Gendarmerie General 
Command 
 7586 from the Security General 
Directorate 
 2696 from the Interior Ministry 
 119 from the Ministry of Education 
 942 Academic 
 15 from High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors 
 1659 from other public officers 
Closure 
 357 Association 
 7 Newspaper 
 1 Journal 
 1 Radio 
 
Reopening 
 1 Healthcare Org. 
 18 Foundation 
 175 Association 
 
Reinstatement 
 139 to Public Offices 
 16 to Academia 
 
 
Executive Decree 678 
(22 November 2016) 
   Turkish military can rehire retired military 
personnel for regular service or as recruiters. 
Executive Decree 679 
(6 January 2017) 
 8 from the Presidency of the Judicial 
Council 
 699 from the Ministry of Justice 
 2687 from the Security General 
Directorate 
 763 from Turkish Armed Forces 
 631 Academic 
 2611 from other public officers 
Closure 
 83 Association 
 
Reopening 
 7 Association 
 11 Newspaper 
 
Reinstatement  
 190 to public offices 
 42 to Academia 
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Executive Decree 680 
(6 January 2017) 
   The Law on Police Duties and Responsibilities 
grants police the authority to access information 
on the identity of internet users for purposes of 
investigating crimes committed online. 
 This decree could revoke citizenship of individuals 
abroad who do not respond to judicial summons 
issued by courts or prosecutors within 90 days. 
Executive Decree 681 
(6 January 2017) 
   The general and admiral cadres previously 
determined by the General Staff before discussion 
in annual Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meetings 
will now be determined by the Defence Ministry. 
Executive Decree 682 
(23 January 2017) 
   Discipline provisions for Law enforcement forces 
Executive Decree 683 
(23 January 2017) 
 134 from the Interior Ministry 
 433 from other public officers 
Closure 
 2 Television 
 
Reinstatement  
 124 to public offices 
 
Executive Decree 684 
(23 January 2017) 
   Detention period reduced to 7 days. But 
maximum detention period for those detained on 
terror charges will continue to be 30 days. 
Executive Decree 685 
(23 January 2017) 
   State of Emergency Actions Monitoring 
Commission established to examine applications 
from individuals affected by state of emergency 
government decrees. 
Executive Decree 686  10 from the Presidency of the 
Judicial Council 
 48 from the Foreign Ministry 
Reinstatement  
 17 to public offices 
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 49 from the Interior Ministry 
 417 from the Security General 
Directorate 
 893 from the Gendarmerie General 
Command 
 2585 from the Ministry of Education 
 330 Academic 
 132 from other public officers 
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